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I. INTRODUCTION
"Privatization" is the process of delegating control of a govern-
mental function to the private sector.2 Although privatization is a
relatively new words the concept of privatization can be traced back
to the very founding of this continent. Christopher Columbus was a
private contractor for the Spanish monarch when he accidentally ran
into America while trying to find a quicker route to China.4 Since
Columbus' blooper and the subsequent formation of the United States,
privatization has been a part of this country's political culture.5 Over
the last twenty years privatization has experienced an unprecedented
2. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIoNARY 928 (10th ed. 1998)
("privatize: ... to change (as a business or industry) from public to private control or
ownership"); E.S. Savas, Symposium: Privatization of Prisons: Privatization and Prisons, 40
VAND. L. REV. 889, 889 (1987) (" TPrivatization' means increased governmental reliance on the
private sector, rather than on government agencies, to satisfy the needs of society."); Mary M.
Shirley, The What, Why, and How of Privatization: A World Bank Perspective, 60 FORDHAM L.
REV. S23, S24 (1992) (conceding that there are many different definitions of privatization but
defining "privatization" within the article as "the transfer of ownership of assets to the private
sector"). Of course, the definition of "privatization" as delegation begs the question of what is a
"governmental function." In deciding to privatize, governments must decide what is properly a
governmental function and what would be better left to the private sector. The line between the
public and private sector is blurred where functions are shared by governmental and private
interests. See Alan K. Chen, "Meet the New Boss...", 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1253, 1269 (1996)
(arguing that public and private realms of governance cannot be distinguished). This Note
defines a governmental function as a public service that is either performed by government or
delegated by government to the private sector.
3. See Savas, supra note 2, at 889 (finding that the word "privatization" was first used in
1969).
4. See KENNETH C. DAVIs, DON'T KNOW MUCH ABOUT HISTORY: EVERYTHING You NEED
TO KNOW ABOUT AMERICAN HISTORY BUT NEVER LEARNED 3-5 (1990).
5. See Lisa Vecoli, The Politics of Privatization, 15 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLY 243, 243
(1995) (noting that the Bank of the United States, the Homestead Act, and the Pony Express
were all examples of privatization).
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level of global support and has become a central part of a strong
American anti-government political movement.6 This political climate
has prompted different levels of government to contract with private
companies for the performance of services as varied as prison opera-
tion, fire protection, and electricity production and distribution.
7
Proponents of privatization claim that the private sector can
perform governmental functions better and with less expense.
Proponents argue that government-provided service is inherently
inefficient because the government lacks profit motive and competi-
tion. Critics of privatization, on the other hand, argue that any value
created by privatization comes at the expense of the general public
good, and that privatization only benefits greedy corporations. Critics
complain that the private sector uses its delegated governmental
power to sacrifice equality of service, privacy, and individual liberty
for profit.8
The critics' fear of this lost liberty and equality raises the issue
of how courts should treat private performers of governmental serv-
ices with regards to constitutional liability. Three alternatives exist.
First, courts could treat these parties like other private industries
and apply no constitutional scrutiny to their actions.9 Second, courts
could recognize the delegated governmental power of private
performers of governmental services and treat them as governmental
actors for purposes of constitutional scrutiny. Third, courts could
respond to the critics' fear by applying a higher degree of
constitutional scrutiny to the actions of private providers of
governmental services than to the actions of the government itself.
In the recent Supreme Court case of Richardson v. McKnight,
the Court chose the third option. 0 This Note will argue that the
Court in Richardson chose wrongly. The Court should have applied
6. See JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF PRIVATIZATION
AND EMPOWERmENT 3 (1996) (pointing to a 1978 California referendum as the beginning of a
strong anti-government movement and trend towards privatization).
7. See David Wessel & John Harwood, Selling Entire Stock! Capitalism is Giddy with
Triumph; Is it Possible to Overdo it?, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1998, at Al, A10 (discussing the
growing popularity of privatization but also noting some dissent to the movement).
8 See id.
9. With the exception of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Constitution only protects
private citizens from conduct by the state, not conduct by other citizens. See The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (holding that the Constitution's restrictions do not apply to private
activity).
10. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 117 S. Ct. 2100, 2107-08 (1997) (implementing
a higher degree of constitutional scrutiny for private providers of governmental services than for
their governmental agency counterparts).
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the same constitutional scrutiny to providers of governmental services
in the private sector that it does to the government itself.
Part II places the legal argument of this Note in context by
providing background on the privatization movement. Part II also
demonstrates the political complexity of the privatization issue and
argues that the matter should be resolved by the legislative, not the
judicial, branch of government. Part III discusses the history of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (the statute that creates a cause of action for
constitutional violations by state actors) and its application to private
parties. Part III also shows how the Supreme Court has greatly
expanded § 1983 liability over the last forty years. State action
doctrine and immunity doctrine are examined in Parts IV and V,
respectively. Part IV explains how the Supreme Court treats some
private parties as govermental actors for purposes of imposing § 1983
liability, while Part V shows how the Court has declined to treat those
same private parties as governmental actors for purposes of limiting §
1983 liability. Part VI scrutinizes Richardson v. McKight and its
effect on privatization. In Richardson, the Court considered the issue
of privatization and again declined to grant private parties subject to
§ 1983 liability the same level of immunity from § 1983 liability that
is enjoyed by the government. The Note concludes in Part VII with a
suggestion for how Congress or the lower courts can mitigate the
negative effects of Richardson.
II. THE PRIVATIZATION MOVEMENT
A. Historical Context and the Present State of the Movement
In the late 1970s, distrust of government and the "taxpayer's
revolt" brought about the "Reagan Revolution" which stressed privati-
zation as a way to get government out of the way." President Reagan
established the President's Commission on Privatization to "identify
those government programs that are not properly the responsibility of
the federal government or that can be performed more efficiently by
the private sector."12 The Commission recommended privatization in
11. See HANDLER, supra note 6, at 3-4 (discussing the origins of the privatization
movement).
12. DAVID F. LiNowEs ET AL., PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT:
REPORT OF THE PRESMENTS COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION at xi (1988).
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such diverse areas as low-income housing, air traffic control, educa-
tion, the postal service, prisons, and medicare. 13
While the Commission's dramatic recommendations have not
yet been widely implemented, privatization has taken hold in many
areas, and it has wide support for application in others. In 1982 the
federal government privatized the National Consumer Cooperative
Bank.14 In 1987 the federal government used a public stock offering
to completely divest itself of Conrail.'5 Even the judicial branch of
government is being privatized somewhat through the growth of
alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") systems.16 The Republican
party kept the movement towards privatization strong with their
"Contract With America" which helped them win elections in 1994
with promises of a more decentralized and smaller federal
government. 17 Republicans are currently pushing for the privatization
of social security. 8
But privatizing federal services is not just for Republicans.
President Clinton signed an appropriations bill in 1995 that estab-
lished a pilot program for privatized tax collection. 9 Currently the
Clinton administration is preparing to privatize the production of the
highly enriched uranium needed to make nuclear weapons by auction-
ing the United States Enrichment Corporation.20
Despite the strong federal support, most examples of privatiza-
tion in the last twenty years have occurred at the state and local
level.21 Many local jurisdictions have privatized such services as solid
waste collection, street repair, bus system operation, ambulance serv-
ice, fire prevention, and hospital operation.22 In light of deregulation,
local governments have also been investigating the potential sale of
13. See id. at xii-xvii.
14. See id. at 1.
15. See id.
16. See Savas, supra note 2, at 892 (defining ADR as arbitration and mediation services
available from private sources); see generally Special Project, Current Issues in Arbitration, 51
VAND. L. REV. 681 (1998) (discussing the rise of arbitration and legal issues surrounding it).
17. See Chen, supra note 2, at 1253 (discussing how the Republicans' "Contract With
America" helped spur the contemporary privatization movement).
18. See Christopher Georges, Social-Security "Privatization' Effort Makes Headway, WALL
ST. J., June 22, 1998, at A24.
19. See Christina N. Smith, Note, The Limits of Privatization: Privacy in the Context of
Tax Collection, 47 CAsE W. REs. L. REV. 627, 627 (1997) (discussing privatized tax collection).
20. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, This Privatization Proposal is Radioactive, WALL ST. J., June 2,
1998, at A22 (criticizing the proposal as bad national security and economic policy).
21. See LINOWES ET AL., supra note 12, at 2.
22. See E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETrER GoVEIRMENT 70-71 (1987)
(displaying chart of percentage of municipalities that contract with private organizations to
supply various types of services).
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government-owned utility distributors,23 and several state govern-
ments are seeking federal approval to experiment with private man-
agement of welfare and medicaid.24
Perhaps the most noteworthy example of the privatization
movement is the rapid privatization of both state and federal pris-
ons.25 By 1991, private companies were operating over fifty state and
federal prisons.26 This number had increased to 100 by the end of
1996.27 The nation's largest private prison company, Corrections
Corporation of America ("CA"), projects that this rapid growth in
privatized prisons will continue.28 In light of the huge and expanding
prisoner population in the U.S., such growth is easily sustainable.29
B. Arguments For and Against Privatization
The most common argument for privatization is the efficiency
created by private competition, evidenced most often by reduced costs.
The President's Commission on Privatization cites examples in which
privatization has saved local governments money without sacrificing
quality. 0 One study has found that it costs a government up to fifty
percent more to provide a service itself rather than to privatize.31
Another source of support for privatization is purely ideological.2 The
notion that a smaller government is inherently better supports pri-
23. See Tom Charlier, Herenton Considers LGW Sale To Boost City Funds, COM. APPEAL
(Memphis), Dec. 3, 1997, at Al (discussing city mayor's consideration of the sale of the local
utility distributor).
24. See Wessel & Harwood, supra note 7, at A10.
25. A computer search on Lexis for the term "privatization" brings up a plurality of
articles concerning privatized prisons. The trend towards privatized prisons is partly accounted
for by the exploding prison population, which has resulted in 40 states being found in violation
of the Constitution because of prison overcrowding. See ADRIAN JAMES ET AL., PRIVATIZING
PRISONS: RHETORIC AND REALITr 5 (1997) (discussing the causes of the prison privatization
movement).
26. See id. at 8; see also Warren L. Ratliff, The Due Process Failure of America's Prison
Privatization Statutes, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 371, 373 n.8 (citing statutes of 25 states and the
federal government that authorize private prisons).
27. See RICHARD W. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 4 (1997).
28. See id.
29. See id. (noting that as of 1996 privatized prisons only account for about 4.6 percent of
the incarcerated population); see also Ratliff, supra note 26, at 372 (noting an estimated growth
rate in private prisons of over 30 percent annually).
30. See LINOWES ET AL., supra note 12, at 2-3 (citing anecdotal evidence of savings from
privatization with no decrease in quality of service). However, the cost savings of privatization
is a disputed issue, with insufficient evidence to clearly support either side. See Savas, supra
note 2, at 894 (presenting statistical survey data).
31. See Savas, supra note 2, at 895.
32. See id. at 895-96 (discussing advantages of privatization).
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vatization as an end in itself rather than just as a means to cost re-
duction. 3
On the other side of the political spectrum, critics argue that
privatization comes at the expense of workers.3 4 They view privatiza-
tion as a transfer of wealth from individual governmental employees
with good pay, benefits, job security, and good working conditions to
the bottom line of a corporation that offers its employees less advan-
tages and has little concern for the public welfare. 35 Critics assert
that private companies' only motivation is profit and that governmen-
tal functions are better performed by governmental agencies that can
work for the public good without the distraction of a profit motivation.
Critics also argue that many functions are so inherently gov-
ernmental that they cannot ethically be delegated to the private sec-
tor.36 In the case of privatized prisons, opponents of privatization
assert that the government should not delegate out the responsibility
and power of regulating the life of a citizen deprived of his freedom.37
They view the power to take away a citizen's freedom as an inherently
governmental responsibility that cannot be safely delegated to a for-
profit corporation.3 In the context of privatized tax collection, oppo-
nents argue that corporations should not be given the private infor-
mation and the enforcement power necessary to collect taxes.39
The argument over privatization goes to the very heart of how
one views the proper role of government. What services should
government perform? What makes a function "inherently governmen-
tal" in nature? The answers to these questions depend on what one
decides are the purposes of government. This Note will make no
attempt to tackle these large questions or decide the merits of privati-
zation, but will instead focus on what role the judiciary should play in
the debate.
33. See id.
34. See HANDLER, supra note 6, at 83-84, 86 (discussing the disadvantages of
privatization).
35. See id at 83 n.20 (questioning whether transferring wealth to private city workers is
worse than to private corporations).
36. See Joseph E. Field, Making Prisons Private: An Improper Delegation of
Governmental Power, 15 HOFSTRA L. REv. 649, 669 (1987) (noting that privatization of prisons
transfers an important element of governmental responsibility).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See Smith, supra note 19, at 639-640 (arguing that tax collection is an inherently
governmental function that should not be privatized).
1999]
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C. The Judicial Branch's Role in Deciding the Future of Privatization
This Note examines the extent of constitutional liability
private parties assume when they peform a governmental function.
Those opposed to privatization argue that private companies taking
on governmental functions should be subject to more constitutional
scrutiny than their governmental agency predecessors. They claim
that a higher scrutiny is warranted because a company's mission is
profit, not the public good, and a company is likely to cut corners on
citizens' constitutional rights to increase profit.40 Those in favor of
privatization answer that a private company motivated to keep the
state's business is less likely to infringe on constitutional rights than
is a disorganized governmental bureaucracy under political pressure
to cut costs. 41
The arguments over how much constitutional scrutiny to apply
reflect the arguments over the broader policy issue of whether to
privatize. Correspondingly, the outcome of this constitutional issue
may determine whether privatization is feasible. If private companies
that take on governmental functions have more constitutional liability
than their governmental agency predecessors, this extra liability may
outweigh any savings from increased efficiency.42 Thus, the question
becomes which branch of government should decide the fate of the
privatization movement. Should the courts decide by applying in-
creased constitutional scrutiny to private parties performing govern-
mental functions, or should courts apply the same constitutional scru-
tiny to all parties performing governmental functions, thereby defer-
ring judgments regarding privatization to the other two branches of
government?43 This Note argues that the courts should provide a level
legal playing field and allow the fate of privatization to be decided by
40. See McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d 417, 424 n.4 (6th Cir. 1996), affd sub noma. Richardson
v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997) ("private corporations... have a greater
incentive to cut costs by infiinging upon the constitutional rights of prisoners").
41. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2112 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that private
corporations are less likely to infringe on constitutional rights than are governmental agencies
because damages come out of their own pockets rather than the public purse).
42. See Edward Felsenthal, Convict's Suit Threatens Privatized Jail Services, WALL ST. J.,
May 21, 1997, at B1 (quoting a Harvard University professor who argues that imposing any
extra constitutional liability on private companies performing governmental services could stop
privatization in its tracks).
43. Note that if the courts estimate that privatization would not be valuable for society
and thus apply stricter constitutional scrutiny to private companies, the increased legal liability
will help ensure that the courts' own estimation is correct by decreasing the savings from
privatization. See infra Part VII.A.
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the other branches of government, which are more qualified to bal-
ance the pros and cons of privatization."
III. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
When a private party performs a state governmental function,
the threat of constitutional liability comes from 42 U.S.C. § 1983.45 It
is in § 1983 cases that courts determine how much constitutional
scrutiny to apply to private parties performing governmental
functions. Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person
who, acting under color of state law, deprives someone of a right
created by federal law as embodied in the U.S. Constitution or a
federal statute.46 Section 1983 does not create a new substantive
right, but is instead an enforcement mechanism for rights already
established by federal statutes or the Constitution.47
A. Original Meaning of§ 1983
Section 1983 was originally adopted as section one of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 and was meant as a threat against southern states
that were not adequately controlling violence against African-
44. Cf Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 621-22 (1908)
(arguing that courts are not equipped properly to make policy decisions and that policy choices
are better made by legislatures after balancing complex political forces).
45. Section 1983 creates an action against unconstitutional behavior of state (not federal)
actors. However, the Supreme Court has created a cause of action, commonly called a Bivens
action, against federal actors that is substantially the same as a § 1983 action against a state
actor. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397
(1971) (recognizing a cause of action for damages against federal agents for conducting a search
in violation of the Fourth Amendment). This Note only analyzes § 1983 because Richardson
and most other cases addressing privatization have involved the delegation of state (not federal)
power to a private party. The argument in this Note applies equally to cases of Bivens actions
against private parties taking on federal governmental functions, however.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
47. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1980) (noting that § 1983 provides a legal
remedy for deprivations of preexisting legal rights found in the Constitution). Section 1983 is
also a remedy for rights created by federal statutes that do not contain their own exclusive
remedies and are not merely statements of policy. See ERWIN CHEMERINsKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION § 8.8 (1994). This Note, however, focuses on the impact of constitutional liability
on the privatization movement, and thus is only concerned with § 1983 as a mechanism for the
enforcement of constitutional rights.
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Americans, primarily perpetrated by the Ku Klux Klan.48 Several
southern state courts and governors had policies of not protecting
African-Americans from the violence of the Klan.49 Section 1983 was
enacted as a measure to allow the federal judiciary to protect citizens
from the southern states' policies of indifference to violations of
individual liberty.5O
Compared to its current impact, § 1983 had a meager begin-
ning. For fifty years after its enactment in 1871, only twenty-one
cases were decided under the statute.5' The initial sparsity of § 1983
cases was in part caused by the narrow manner in which the Supreme
Court initially interpreted the statute. For ninety years the Court
and commentators pronounced that § 1983 only applied to actions by
state officials pursuant to official state policy.52 This interpretation is
consistent with the intent behind § 1983: to protect citizens from
official state indifference to Klan violence. According to the Court, the
phrase "under color of state law" meant that § 1983 was solely a
protection for citizens against federal right violations that were offi-
cially sanctioned by one of the three branches of a state government.53
The Court held that § 1983 was not a remedy for the wrongful acts of
individuals acting contrary to state policy.-4 Thus, § 1983 originally
was a weapon against state policies, not a weapon against actions by
individual state officers.
55
48. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985) (finding that the passage of the Act was
a direct result of"the campaign of violence and deception in the South, fomented by the Ku Klux
Klan, which was denying decent citizens their civil and political rights'); Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REV. 959, 973-74 (1987) (discussing the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and noting that it was also known as the Ku
Klux Act of 1871).
49. See Nichol, supra note 48, at 974-75 (noting the 1871 Congress' perception that
southern state courts and executives were under the control of the Klan).
50. See id.
51. See Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?,
26 IND. L.J. 361, 363 (1951).
52. See PETER W. Low & JOHN C JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 970 (3d ed. 1994) (noting that there was a "long-standing
assumption that § 1983 reached only misconduct either officially authorized or so widely toler-
ated as to amount to 'custom or usage' ").
53. See id. at 969-71.
54. In the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, the Court remarked that a statute such as § 1983
cannot be enforced against "the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority in
the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings." The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
55. See Low & JEFFRIES, supra note 52, at 851 (explaining the original interpretation of §
1983).
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B. The Changing Interpretation of § 1983
In Monroe v. Pape, decided in 1961, the Supreme Court greatly
expanded the scope of § 1983.56 Monroe held that § 1983 could reach
actions of individual state officers even if their actions were not sanc-
tioned by state policy.5 7 Thus, the Court altered its interpretation of §
1983 from a relatively narrow statute protecting against state-sanc-
tioned violations of federal law, to a statute protecting against viola-
tions of federal law by state officials even if the state officials were
acting contrary to state law.58
Although the decision affected a radical change in § 1983's
interpretation, the Court in Monroe grounded its decision in legisla-
tive history that had been created almost a century before.59 The
Court looked to statements of legislators in the 1871 Congress that
the Court felt implied a broader interpretation of § 1983 than had yet
been recognized by any court.60 The Monroe dissent preferred to trust
the prevailing interpretation of § 1983 at the time of its passage,
which offered redress for an injury only when no redress was
available under state law in state court.
61
Thus, ninety years after its passage, Monroe gave § 1983 sharp
teeth as an all-purpose cause of action against state officials who
infringe on any federally-created right, even if the state officials are
clearly acting against state policy. In contrast to the small number of
56. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dept. of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
57. See Monroe, 369 U.S. at 183; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 47, § 8.3 (explaining
the holding in Monroe).
58. Congress passed § 1983 in 1871 because southern states were not offering a judicial
remedy to individual rights violations by the Klan. The purpose of § 1983 was to fill any gaps in
a state's laws against individual rights violations. Without the legislature amending § 1983, the
Court almost 100 years later reinterpreted the statute to offer a remedy against individual
rights violations even when the state already offers such a remedy. Thus, after Monroe, § 1983
offers a federal remedy in addition to, instead of just in lieu of, any state remedies for individual
rights violations. With Monroe, § 1983 became a weapon against individual state officials in
addition to its original function as a weapon against state policies.
59. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173-76 (citing legislative record of the 1871 Congress).
60. See id. The Court quoted an opponent of the legislation, who said, "This section gives
to any person who may have been injured in any of his rights.., a civil action for damages
against the wrongdoer in the Federal courts." Id. at 178. The Court interpreted this statement
to mean that a right of action arose upon a wrongdoing, even if in violation of state policy. Id. at
180.
61. See id. at 237 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The dissent found that, "all the evidence
converges to the conclusion that Congress by § 1983 created a civil liability enforceable in the
federal courts only in instances of injury for which redress was barred in the state courts
because some 'statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage' sanctioned the grievance
complained of." Id (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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§ 1983 cases brought before Monroe, by 1977 over 20,000 § 1983 suits
were filed per year.62 Because of Monroe, § 1983 is now used for much
broader purposes than its original goal of defending against state-
sanctioned Klan violence. Prisoners taking advantage of § 1983's new
power have brought almost half of all post-Monroe § 1983 actions. 63
Section 1983 is now described by some as the most important statute
in contemporary America.6
IV. STATE ACTION DOCTRINE: EXPANDING 1983's REACH
One-hundred years after the enactment of § 1983, the Supreme
Court further reinterpreted the statute to reach certain private par-
ties, instead of just governmental officials. 65 In Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., decided by the Court in 1970, a restaurant denied service to a
white school teacher because she was with six black students.66 On
her way out of the restaurant, a police officer arrested her for va-
grancy.67 The school teacher brought a § 1983 action against the pri-
vate restaurant owner for conspiracy with the police officer to deny
her of her Fourteenth Amendment rights.6 The police officer's con-
duct was found to be a violation of the Constitution, and the Court
imputed the police officer's "state action" to the private restaurant
owner because it found a conspiracy between the two.69
The Adickes Court decided that the private party defendant's
actions warranted treatment as governmental actions subject to the
prohibitions of the Constitution.70 The restaurant owner was found to
62. See THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 86 (2d
ed. 1987) (citing statistics from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts).
63. See Low & JEFFRIES, supra note 52, at 974 (citing the Annual Reports of the Director,
Administrative Office of the United States Courts).
64. See MARTIN A. ScHwARTz & JOHN E. KIRKLiN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS,
DEFENSES, AND FEES 4 (2d ed. 1991) (declaring that "[n]o federal statute is more important in
contemporary American law").
65. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) (applying § 1983 liability to
a private party for the first time).
66. See id. at 146.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 152.
70. See id. at 169-71. The school teacher had to demonstrate that the private restaurant
owner was a "state actor" because the Fourteenth Amendment only prohibits discrimination by
the government. See id. at 169. The Constitution does not protect against private misbehavior,
no matter how egregious.
No matter what right is asserted under § 1983, however, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant violated that right while acting "under color of state law." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994);
see also Adickes, 398 U.S. at 150. When a state official is the defendant, the Fourteenth
Amendment's state action requirement and § 1983's "under color of state law" requirement are
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have reached an understanding with the police officer to work
together to deny the plaintiff her constitutional rights.71 Although the
restaurant owner was not a state official, he was a "willful participant
in joint activity" with a state official, and thus he qualified as a state
actor according to the Court.72 Thus, the Adickes Court extended §
1983's reach to private-party activity by using a conspiracy theory of
state action.
As originally interpreted, § 1983 only protected against
individual rights violations by a state official when no state-provided
remedy existed because the state official was carrying out state pol-
icy.73 Yet, one hundred years after § 1983's passage, the Court in
Adickes expanded the statute's reach to protect against wrongful
action by a private party if the party is in willful joint participation
with a state governmental officer, even f the action is against state
policy and regardless of whether a state-provided remedy exists.74
The Court in Adickes did require that the private party have
some conspiratorial intent before the unconstitutional conduct of a
state officer would be imputed to bim.75 A private party's good faith
behavior was not actionable under § 1983. In 1982, however, the
Court broadened § 1983's reach even more in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co. 76 Edmondson Oil Company had sued Lugar in Virginia state court
coexistent. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982) (stating that the
statutory requirement of action "under the color of state law" and the "state action" requirement
under the Fourteenth Amendment are identical). When a private party is the defendant,
though, the two tests are separate although largely similar. See id. at 928-30. The "under color
of state law" requirement will always be met when the state action requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment is met, but satisfaction of the "under color of state law" test does not
necessarily imply satisfaction of the state action requirement. See id. at 935 n.18. Thus a
private party could be acting "under color of state law" but not be acting closely enough with the
state or a state official to be deemed a state actor. This distinction is only relevant when the
plaintiff is resting his § 1983 claim against a private party on a federal statute that does not
have a state action requirement. See id. at 934-35. In such a case, the plaintiff will have to
show that the defendant violated the federal statute and that the defendant was acting "under
color of state law." If the plaintiff in a § 1983 action shows a violation of the Constitution, then
the "under color of state law" requirement of§ 1983 is automatically met since a violation of the
Constitution requires state action, and a showing of state action automatically satisfies the
"under color of state law" test.
71. SeeAdickes, 398 U.S. at 152.
72. Id.
73 See supra Part III.A.
74. The Supreme Court affirmed the Adickes holding in Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-
29 (1980), in which a private party was held liable under § 1983 for conspiring with a judge to
deny someone's constitutional rights. The private party was held liable even though the judge
had judicial immunity from suit. See id. at 27-28.
75. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 152 (stating that a private party involved in a conspiracy can
be liable under § 1983, even though not an official of the state).
76. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
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to recover a debt, and had asked the county clerk to attach and order
the sheriff to seize a portion of Lugar's property under a Virginia
prejudgment attachment statute that had been in use for more than
150 years.77 The sheriff seized Lugar's property, and Lugar responded
by bringing a § 1983 action against Edmondson for acting jointly with
the clerk and the sheriff to deprive him of property without due proc-
ess of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.78
Although Edmondson had in good faith relied on a 150-year-old
statute in asking the clerk to order the sheriff to seize Lugar's prop-
erty, the Court held Edmondson liable under § 1983.79 The Court
abandoned the bad faith conspiracy requirement of Adickes and re-
placed it with a "fair attribution" test. 0 While Adickes held that a
private party could be liable under § 1983 if that private party agreed
to help a governmental official violate someone's constitutional rights,
Lugar only required that the private party's conduct be "fairly attrib-
utable" to the state.81
Lugar is just one example of the Court's expansion of state
action theory over the last forty years. The Court has, in fact, devel-
oped several tests to justify turing a private party's actions into
constitutionally-restricted state actions. The "symbiosis test" looks to
the mutual interdependence of the private party with the state.8 2 The
"nexus test" focuses on the state's involvement in the challenged ac-
77. See id. at 924-25.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 942. The Court did not reach the question of the availability of a good faith
defense. See id. at 942 n.23.
80. See id. at 937.
81. Id. Lugar's fair attribution test is a two-part inquiry. First, the private party must
have exercised a right that is created by the state but is unconstitutional. In Lugar, this prong
was satisfied by Edmondson's use of a state statute that was later found to be unconstitutional.
See id. at 939-41. Second, the private party must have acted together with or obtained
significant aid from a state official. See id. at 941. Edmondson received significant aid from the
clerk and sheriff in having Lugar's property seized, so the Court labeled Edmondson a state
actor. See id at 941-42.
The dissent in Lugar was not persuaded by the majority's interpretation of § 1983, which
imposed liability on a private party who in good faith relied on a presumptively valid state
statute. See id. at 944-56 (Powell, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the majority in
Lugar "undermines fundamental distinctions between the common-sense categories of state and
private conduct." Id. at 946.
82. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). In Burton, the
Court found that a privately-owned restaurant was a state actor subject to constitutional
restrictions because it was located in and leased space from a municipal parking garage. See id.
at 724-25. The Court focused on the financial arrangement between the city and the restaurant,
and found that the restaurant was dependent on the state for its existence and thus should be
treated as if it were the state. See also Perez v. Sugarman, 499 F.2d 761, 765-66 (2d Cir. 1974)
(applying the symbiosis test to a private foster care agency that took care of children in the
state's custody).
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tivity of the private party.83 Most relevant to privatization is the
"public function test," which holds constitutionally accountable those
private entities performing a function that has been traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the state.8
The existence of several state action "tests" may suggest that
determining whether a defendant is a state actor is a precise, clear-
cut process. On the contrary, state action doctrine is abstract and
leads to unpredictable and arguably ad hoc decision making.85 Some
commentators have claimed that courts merely balance the facts to
estimate the strength of the private party's relationship or resem-
blance to the state, and then apply one of the state action tests to
justify their decision.86
The malleable nature of state action doctrine provides oppor-
tunities for courts to tread far into private conduct. Whenever the
Court expands state action theory it is also extending the reach of §
1983 because it brings more behavior within the restraints of the
Constitution, which § 1983 enforces. The Lugar Court recognized the
83. Under the nexus test, a private party may be labeled a state actor only as to its
activities that are heavily regulated by the state. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004
(1982) (holding that if a nexus exists between the state and the challenged action of the
regulated private party, then the private party is treated as the state for purposes of constitu-
tional liability). In Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663-64 (1944), the nexus test was used to
characterize the Texas Democratic party as a state actor, and thus force it to stop excluding
blacks from its election primaries. Since Texas heavily regulated the primaries of the political
parties, the Democratic party, although a private organization, was subject to constitutional
limitations when it held a primary. See id. at 663. According to the Court, "[tjhe party takes its
character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon it by state statutes; the duties do not
become matters of private law [ust] because they are performed by a political party." Id.
84. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (discussing the public function
test but finding that a private school does not qualify as a state actor since schools have never
been the exclusive domain of government). In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505-06 (1946),
the Court applied the public function test and held that a private company could not restrict
free speech on its own private property because its private property so closely resembled a town
that the Court thought it fair to treat the property as a public town and the company as the
state. Other activities that courts have found to be public functions include: operation of a
park, see Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966); process serving, see United States v.
Wiseman, 445 F.2d 792, 796 (2d Cir. 1971); and care of foster children, see Perez v. Sugarman,
499 F.2d 761, 765-66 (2d Cir. 1974).
85. See Charles L. Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Forward: 'State Action,' Equal
Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967) (calling the state
action doctrine a "conceptual disaster area"); see also Duncan Kennedy, Note, The Stages of the
Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1357 (1982) (claiming that no
real distinction exists between what is public and what is private).
86. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939 (citing various state action tests and then noting that the
tests may not be distinguishable in operation); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715, 722 (1961) (boiling state action tests down to a balance of facts); see also Mark Tushnet,
Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 383, 384 (1988) (arguing
that courts' state action decisions vary based on the courts' evaluation of the substantive claim
being made).
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danger of subjecting private parties to constitutional liability and
suggested the possibility of an affirmative defense for private party
state actors.8 7 Lugar hinted that this affirmative defense might pro-
tect good faith private party conduct and be similar to "the availabil-
ity of a good-faith defense, or qualified immunity, to state officials." 88
The next Part addresses the affirmative defense to § 1983 actions
available to state officials and the Court's refusal thus far to
implement Lugar's suggestion of a similar defense for private party
state actors.
V. IMMUNITY DOCTRINE89
A. Development of Qualified Immunity from § 1983
Liability for State Officials
The first recognition of qualified immunity from a § 1983 ac-
tion was in response to the increased constitutional liability placed on
governmental officials in the wake of Monroe. Pierson v. Ray, decided
six years after Monroe, involved a § 1983 suit against police officers
for making an allegedly unconstitutional arrest.90 Although the text
of § 1983 does not confer any defenses or immunities, the Pierson
Court decided that the original drafters of § 1983 did not mean to
deny state officer defendants of any defenses or immunities that
87. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942 n.23 (suggesting the possibility of a good faith defense for
private parties). Note that Lugar was the case that abandoned the element of conspiratorial
intent that was previously required to subject a private party to § 1983 liability. See supra note
80 and accompanying text. Thus, Lugar's suggestion of a good faith defense for private party
defendants is really a suggestion to add back in the bad faith requirement it had abandoned, but
to add it in as an affirmative defense instead of as a necessary element of the plaintiffs case.
This shift would mean that instead of good faith private conduct being protected from
constitutional liability by the state action doctrine, private parties would have to rely on their
ability to affirmatively show good faith. Yet, since the Constitution would not guarantee the
availability of a good faith defense, it could be abandoned and private parties acting in good
faith could be subject to constitutional liability.
88. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942 n.23.
89. This Part addresses the affirmative defenses created by the Supreme Court to
counterbalance § 1983 constitutional liability. These affirmative defenses have names such as
"qualified immunity," "good faith defense" and "qualified good faith immunity," but there is
often no sharp distinction between these labels. This Note examines all affirmative defenses to
§ 1983 constitutional liability under the rubric of "immunity doctrine."
90. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). In Pierson several officers were sued under §
1983 for arresting several black clergymen who had entered the segregated area of a bus
terminal. Id. at 549-50.
504
PRIVATIZATION AND RICHARDSON
existed at the time of § 1983's enactment.91 The Court looked at the
common law of 1871 and determined that those performing law
enforcement functions had a right to a "defense of good faith and
probable cause" in actions for false arrest.92 Thus, police officers
would not be liable under § 1983 if they could show that they
reasonably believed in good faith that the arrests were
constitutional.
93
Although the Pierson Court grounded its holding on statutory
interpretation and the common law of 1871, the Court in Scheuer v.
Rhodes based its grant of qualified immunity to public officers on
policy reasons.9 The Court stated that qualified immunity from §
1983 liability was necessary to prevent the injustice of subjecting an
officer to liability for exercising in good faith the discretion his job
requires.9 5 The Court also noted that such unmitigated liability might
deter a public officer from exercising the duties of his job with the
decisiveness and judgment needed.96
In Wood v. Strickland, the Court clarified the components of
the qualified immunity defense that it had created in Pierson, holding
that the defense contained an objective and subjective good faith re-
quirement. 97 Under this rule, to escape § 1983 liability, the defendant
must show that he subjectively believed that he was acting constitu-
tionally, and he must show that this belief was objectively reason-
able.98 A belief is not objectively reasonable, the Court explained, if it
is against "settled, indisputable law." 9
The objective component of the qualified immunity defense
articulated in Wood was purely a legal question that could be resolved
on a motion for summary judgment by the defendant. The subjective
component, however, involved a question of fact that required a trial.
Thus, a plaintiff with a frivolous claim was able to force an official to
91. See id. at 554-55. The Pierson dissent criticized the majority for ignoring the plain
language of § 1983, which does not contain any immunities or defenses. See id. at 558-59
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
92. See id. at 557. For criticism of the Court's historical approach to granting immunity,
see Richard A. Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the Court's
Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REV. 741, 781-96 (1987).
93. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 557 (defining the good faith defense and placing the burden of
proof on the defendants to show good faith).
94. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974) (granting qualified immunity to a
governor and other state officials).
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975).
98. See id. at 321-22.
99. 1d. at 322.
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face trial by merely alleging malicious intent. In Harlow v. Fitgerald,
the Court acknowledged that the subjective component of the
qualified immunity defense created the opportunity for frivolous
claims to be tried, at great expense to the innocent defendant and
society as a whole.10 In abandoning the subjective component of the
qualified immunity defense, the Harlow Court noted that one of the
purposes for extending qualified immunity was to prevent frivolous
lawsuits against public officials from going to trial.101 Frivolous
lawsuits diverted defendants' official energy away from public issues
and deterred able citizens from becoming public servants. 10 2 In
addition, the threat of frivolous lawsuits discouraged the unflinching
discharge of public duties.
10 3
Thus, after Harlow a defendant protected by the qualified
immunity defense can avoid § 1983 liability if his actions did not vio-
late a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable
person would have known. 1°4 The defendant's subjective intent is no
longer relevant. Not all defendants in § 1983 actions can assert the
qualified immunity defense, however; the ability to assert qualified
immunity depends on the type of functional role the defendant
plays.15 If the qualified immunity defense existed for the defendant's
functional role in 1871 common law, or if current public policy reasons
100. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) ("lit cannot be disputed seriously that
claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the guilty-at a cost not only to the




104. Id. at 818. For a criticism of Harlow that focuses on the question of how to decide
what a reasonable person knows about the Constitution, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 47, § 8.6
at 476-79.
105. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 810 ("Moreoever, in general our cases have followed a
'functional' approach to immunity law."). Because the purpose of qualified immunity is to
encourage the uninhibited performance of governmental functions, to gain immunity a
defendant must show that he or she was performing a governmental function at the time of the
challenged action. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988) (discussing the purpose of
qualified immunity and stating that the functional approach to deciding whether to grant
immunity requires the Court to "examine the nature of the functions with which a particular
official or class of officials has been lawfully entrusted, and [to] seek to evaluate the effect that
exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those
functions"); see also Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1644 (1997) (denying the President
immunity from suit for actions not taken in the performance of a governmental function and
stating that "immunities are grounded in 'the nature of the function performed, not the identity
of the actor who performed it' ") (quoting Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474
U.S. 193, 201 (1985) (stating that absolute immunity "flows not from rank or title ot 'location
within the Government,' but from the nature of the responsibilities of the individual official")
(quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,511 (1978)).
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justify extending the defense to that type of functional role, then the
defendant will be entitled to the qualified immunity defense.0 6
B. Qualified Immunity Not Extended to Private Parties
The qualified immunity defense created by Pierson and
strengthened in Harlow acts as a counterbalance to the increase in §
1983 liability on governmental officials brought by Monroe. In Wyatt
v. Cole, the Court refused the opportunity to apply the new defense to
limit the increase in constitutional liability on private parties brought
by Adickes and Lugar.107 In Wyatt, a private party was sued under §
1983 for invoking a state replevin statute, which was later held to be
unconstitutional, to seize property in the possession of the plaintiff.08
The defendant claimed the qualified immunity created in Harlow.0 9
While a majority of the Wyatt Court agreed that Lugar created
too much constitutional liability for private parties, a majority also
agreed that the qualified immunity doctrine of Harlow should not
apply to a private party defendant." 0 The Court based its decision to
deny qualified immunity to a private party on both historical and
policy grounds. While a private party defendant of the type in Wyatt
was entitled to a "good faith defense" at common law in 1871, this
common law defense did not amount to the stronger "qualified immu-
nity" created by Harlow."' Because the Wyatt Court did not think
106. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 117 S. Ct. 2100, 2103 (1997) (citing Wyatt
v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992), as establishing that existence of qualified immunity defense
depends on common law of 1871 or current public policy).
107. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992).
108. Id. at 160.
109. See id.
110. Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Scalia joined, wrote a concurring opinion that
acknowledged the need to establish a "good faith defense" from § 1983 liability for private
parties to counterbalance the amount of constitutional liability potentially left on private parties
by Lugar. See id. at 169-75 (Kennedy, J., concurring). When the two concurring Justices' votes
are added to the votes of the three dissenters who were in favor of giving private parties
Harlow's qualified immunity, a majority exists for mitigating the § 1983 liability left on private
parties by Lugar. See id. at 177 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). However, Justices Kennedy and
Scalia believed that Harlow's "qualified immunity" was too powerful to give to private parties
since it included no subjective good faith requirement. See id. at 169-75 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Kennedy's concurrence advocated giving private parties the two-part qualified
immunity defense that existed before Harlow. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. The
concurrence labeled this defense the "good faith defense" to distinguish it from the "qualified
immunity" created by Harlow's abandonment of the subjective good faith requirement. See
Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 169-75.
111. See id. at 165. In Pierson, the Court transformed the common law good faith defense
into a qualified immunity defense, but Harlow abandoned the subjective good faith requirement
of that defense and left "qualified immunity" with only an objectively reasonable requirement.
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that the policy behind the decision in Harlow applied to a private
party defendant, the Court refused to extend this policy-based immu-
nity."1 The Court did expressly limit its holding to the issue of a
private party faced with § 1983 liability for invoking a state replevin
statute.113 The Court also left open the possibility of a "good faith
defense" for private parties."1
Thus, after Wyatt the Supreme Court left unresolved the ques-
tion of how to deal with the extensive § 1983 constitutional liability
potentially left upon private defendants by Lugar. Lower courts were
free to respond in a variety of ways. They could rely on the express
limitation of the Wyatt holding and grant Harlow's qualified immu-
nity to types of private defendants other than the type at issue in
Wyatt. 15 Conversely,. they could extend the reasoning of Wyatt and
deny any affirmative defense to private parties. 116 As a compromise,
courts could deny Harlow's qualified immunity but grant another
form of affirmative good faith defense.117
VI. RICHARDSON V. McKNIGHT
A. Holding
The case of Richardson v. McKnight gave the Supreme Court
the opportunity to resolve the split among the circuits regarding the
extent of constitutional liability a private party accepts when taking
on a governmental function.11s However, a divided Court produced
only a narrow holding that left many issues unresolved. The Court
Harlow's new definition of qualified immunity makes transforming a common law good faith
defense into qualified immunity a greater leap than what was performed in Pierson.
112. See id. at 167 (holding that "the rationales mandating [Harlow's] qualified immunity
for public officials are not applicable to private parties").
113. See id. at 168-69.
114. See id. at 169 ("In so holding, however, we do not foreclose the possibility that private
defendants faced with § 1983 liability under Lugar... could be entitled to an affirmative
defense based on good faith.").
115. See, e.g., Sherman v. Four County Counseling Ctr., 987 F.2d 397, 406 (7th Cir. 1993)
(granting qualified immunity); Warner v. Grand County, 57 F.3d 962, 964, 967 (10th Cir. 1995)
(same).
116. See, e.g., Manis v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 859 F. Supp. 302, 305 (M.D. Tenn. 1994)
(denying qualified immunity).
117. See Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261, 1266-67 (6th Cir. 1988) (suggesting an affirmative
defense for private parties different from Harlow's qualified immunity).
118. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 117 S. Ct. 2100,2103 (1997) (defining the issue
before them as whether privately-employed prison guards are entitled to qualified immunity
from § 1983 liability).
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held, in a five to four decision, that when a private company operating
for profit in competition with other private companies and with little
direct government supervision receives a contract to administer a
"major lengthy" governmental function such as running a prison, that
company's employees are not entitled to qualified immunity from §
1983 liability."9 The Court limited its holding by noting that it had
not decided whether the private defendants would be eligible for a
"special" good faith defense from § 1983 actions. 120 Thus, the Court
decided that the defendants would not be eligible for Harlow's
qualified immunity, but that they may be eligible for another type of
good faith affirmative defense.
B. Facts
Ronnie McKnight was a prisoner at Tennessee's South Central
Correctional Center ("SCCC") when he filed a § 1983 action in federal
court against prison guards for violating his eighth amendment
rights.12' He alleged that the defendant prison guards inflicted seri-
ous physical injury upon him by subjecting him to overly tight re-
straints during his transport to another prison. 22 McKnight's com-
plaint was not unusual in the sense that prisoners file many
complaints every year in federal court alleging that prison guards
have violated the prisoners' constitutional rights.123 Most of these
complaints are dismissed before discovery because the prison guards
successfully raise the affirmative defense of qualified immunity as
defined in Harlow."2
But the prison guards that McKnight sued were employed by
Corrections Corporation of America ("CCA"), a private corporation,
and the federal district court, citing Wyatt, held that privately-em-
119. See id. at 2108.
120. See id. The Court also limited its holding by assuming without deciding that the
defendants were state actors subject to constitutional prohibitions and § 1983 liability.
Although the Richardson Court specifically declined to decide this issue, there is little question
that the privately-owned prison and its employees would be considered state actors under a
Lugar analysis. See McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d 417, 419 n.3 (6th Cir. 1996), affd sub nom.
Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997) (noting that the, prison guards do
not dispute that they were state actors subject to § 1983 liability under a Lugar analysis and
citing case law in support of a state action finding); Giron v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 14 F.
Supp. 2d 1245, 1248-51 (D. N.M. 1998) (holding a private prison guard to be a state actor).
121. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2102.
122. See McKnight, 88 F.3d at 418-19.
123. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
124. One purpose for the qualified immunity created in Harlow was to prevent the trial of
frivolous § 1983 suits. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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ployed prison guards were not entitled to the qualified immunity
afforded their publicly-employed counterparts. 12 5 The prison guards
filed an interlocutory appeal from the denial of their motion to dis-
miss, and it was this appeal that the Supreme Court addressed.
C. Critical Analysis of the Court's Reasoning
The Court in Richardson relied heavily on Wyatt v. Cole in
reaching its decision. The majority opinion began by pointing out
three important aspects of Wyatt. 26 First, Wyatt reaffirmed that
private parties can be subject to constitutional liability if they act like
or in cooperation with the state enough to be deemed state actors.
Second, Wyatt specified that to extend qualified immunity to a
defendant, a court had to find that a similarly-situated defendant was
entitled to an immunity at common law in 1871, or that public policy
concerns warranted such an immunity. Finally, the majority
recognized that Wyatt's holding of no qualified immunity only applied
to private party defendants who have conspired with state officials in
their challenged actions, 127 not to all private parties, and thus was not
dispositive of the issue in Richardson.
1. Rejection of Functional Approach to Historical Analysis
After reviewing Wyatt, the Court examined at length the his-
tory of prisons in this country and in England to determine if the
common law of 1871 provided an immunity for a defendant like the
one in Richardson.1-8 Instead of looking for historical evidence of an
immunity provided for those who performed the governmental
function of prison guard, however, the Court focused its historical
search on whether an immunity was traditionally provided for prison
guards employed by a private company. 29 The Court found no
evidence of an immunity for privately-employed prison guards in
1871.130
125. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2102.
126. See id. at 2103.
127. Wyatt only applied to private defendants "faced with § 1983 liability for invoking a
state replevin, garnishment, or attachment statute." Id. (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158,
168-69) (1992)).
128. See id. at 406.
129. The Court had previously extended § 1983 qualified immunity to state-employed
prison guards. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1978). Procunier, however,
relied on public policy and not historical availability of immunity. See id.
130. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2105.
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Richardson's focus on who employs the defendant, instead of
what function the defendant performs, contradicts the Court's previ-
ous reliance on a functional approach to granting qualified immu-
nity.131 In Harlow, the Court stated that determining whether a de-
fendant would be entitled to assert the qualified immunity defense
depended on what type of functional role the defendant played. 132
Similarly, in Briscoe v. LaHue, the Court stated, "our cases clearly
indicate that immunity analysis rests on functional categories, not on
the status of the defendant."33
Richardson's rejection of a functional approach in determining
the availability of qualified immunity is also inconsistent with the
Court's reliance on a functional approach in determining which pri-
vate parties are subject to § 1983 liability in the first place. The state
action doctrine's "public function" test subjects a private party to §
1983 liability if the private party performs a traditional governmental
function.34 The premise of the public function test is that, although
the Constitution does not apply to private activity, it is fair to treat a
private party performing a traditional government function as if it
were the government for purposes of constitutional liability. In
Richardson, the Court apparently accepted this premise for purposes
of assuming that the privately-employed prison guard defendants are
subject to § 1983 liability, but then rejected this premise by not treat-
ing the defendants like state employees for purposes of immunity
analysis.
The Court's failure to find any evidence of an immunity for
privately-employed prison guards in 1871 is not surprising, because
the Court was not able to find any case in or before 1871 that involved
a privately-employed prison guard. 3 5 Indeed, no such cases exist,
because running prisons has traditionally been the domain of gov-
ernment, which ironically is the same reason the Court is willing to
subject the privately-employed prison guard to § 1983 liability. Thus,
the Court's analysis places private parties performing traditionally
governmental functions in a "Catch 22." A private party is subject to
constitutional liability because it is performing a function
131. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
132. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 810 (1982) ("Moreover, in general our cases have
followed a Tunctional' approach to immunity law."); see also supra note 105.
133. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 342 (1983).
134. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (applying the public function test
but finding that a private school does not qualify as a state actor since schools have never been
the exclusive domain of government); see also supra note 84.
135. Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2104.
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traditionally performed only by the government, but it will not be
eligible for qualified immunity from this constitutional liability
because there is no tradition of immunity for private parties perform-
ing such a function.
The Court was able to find three 19th-century cases after 1871
in which private prison contractors were defendants, but none dis-
cussed the issue of immunity136 and none involved § 1983, because the
Court did not extend § 1983 liability to private parties until 1970.137
Thus the Supreme Court was willing to impose § 1983 liability on
private parties even though no tradition of such liability exists, but
the Court was unwilling to extend immunity from § 1983 to private
parties because the private parties have no tradition of such immu-
nity.
2. Rejection of Functional Approach to Public Policy Analysis
Because the Court could not find a tradition of immunity for
privately-employed prison guards, the Court next addressed the
question of whether public policy justified the extension of qualified
immunity to privately-employed prison guards. The Court acknowl-
edged several purposes for granting qualified immunity, but found the
most important purpose of qualified immunity to be the encourage-
ment of the vigorous and uninhibited exercise of public duty.138
According to the Court, qualified immunity allows public officials to
perform their duty without the unwarranted timidity that the threat
of too much constitutional liability would create.139
In contrast to governmental officials, the Court decided that
privately-employed prison guards did not need the incentive of quali-
fied immunity to ensure the bold performance of their job. The Court
reasoned that the competitive market pressures present in the private
sector, combined with profit motive, would prevent timid and
ineffective job performance.140 Private prison companies with overly
timid guards would lose out to other companies, so these companies
136. See id.
137. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
138. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2105-06. Other purposes for granting qualified
immunity noted by the Court include: protecting the government's ability to perform its
traditional functions; ensuring that talented candidates are not deterred from entering public
service; protecting citizens from unwarranted timidity by public officials; contributing to
principled and fearless decision making; and preventing officials from being distracted from
their governmental duties by lawsuits. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 2106-07.
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have incentives to ensure vigorous job performance, the Court rea-
soned.141
A publicly-employed prison guard, the Court noted, operates in
a system where vigor and effectiveness are not subject to the same
market checks. The publicly-employed prison guard operates in a
"system that is responsible through elected officials to voters who,
when they vote, rarely consider the performance of individual subde-
partments or civil servants specifically and in detail."42  Thus, the
Court reasoned, a publicly-employed prison guard needs extra incen-
tive to act boldly, while a privately-employed prison guard already
has this incentive from market pressures.
Market pressures may induce a private prison to operate more
effectively and efficiently than a government-run prison,43 but market
pressures are unlikely to ensure vigorous job performance by individ-
ual private prison guards who are subject to personal liability for
constitutional violations. The Court did not consider that a § 1983
plaintiff is precluded from suing a company under a respondeat supe-
rior theory.'" A § 1983 plaintiff must sue individual private employ-
ees who are less likely than their employer to take account of the
market pressures that the Court discusses. An individual prison
guard faced with potential personal liability for his actions is unlikely
to be emboldened by the chance to improve the market position of his
employer.
Even if market pressures were affecting the behavior of indi-
vidual prison guards, the market is unlikely to encourage prison
141. See id. at 2106.
142. Id. at 2107.
143. This point is controversial, however, as opponents of privatization believe private
companies do not perform governmental services more efficiently. See supra note 30.
144. The defendants in Richardson were individual employees, so Richardson did not
address the liability of the company itself for § 1983 violations. The case of Monell v. Dept. of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), precludes the possibility that any § 1983 defendant could
be held liable under a respondeat superior theory, so a private company would have to have an
official policy in violation of the Constitution to be subject to § 1983 liability. See also Sanders v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 984 F.2d 972, 975-76 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying Monell's rule against §
1983 vicarious liability to a private defendant). But see Groom v. Safeway, Inc., No. C96-0417D,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10999, at *10 n.4 (W.D. Wash. July 18, 1997) (arguing that there is no
binding authority for the proposition that a private entity cannot be vicariously liable for the
actions of its employees in violation of§ 1983).
Still undecided, however, is the issue of when an unconstitutional action would be
attributable directly to the corporation and not just to the individual corporate officer.
Presumably, this issue would be decided by analogy to the cases outlining when a municipality
is liable under § 1983. Monell held that a municipality is liable under § 1983 when the
challenged action is an execution of official governmental policy or custom. See Monell, 436 U.S.




guards to perform their jobs more vigorously, unless more vigorous
performance somehow lowers costs. More vigorous prison guard
behavior is not likely to lower costs, but instead is likely to raise costs
as it subjects the prison guard to potential legal liability.145 Private
prison guards have no more incentive to act vigorously than do public
prison guards, and now that the law applies more scrutiny to the
actions of private prison guards than to the actions of public prison
guards, private prison guards are likely to be more hesitant in their
job performance than public prison guards.
In addition, this rule inequitably subjects a privately-employed
prison guard to more constitutional liability simply because the
private prison that employs him has market incentives to operate
more effectively. To an individual prison guard, it makes little
difference whether his paycheck comes from the state directly or from
a private company that the state pays to run the prison. A private
prison guard works under the same conditions and performs the same
public duties as a state-employed prison guard. The law should treat
persons equally who are in like situations performing the same work,
unless a good reason exists not to do so. The Court in Richardson did
not suggest any distinction between a privately-employed prison
guard and a state-employed prison guard that makes it fair to subject
one to more liability than the other.
From the opposite perspective, it makes little difference to an
individual prisoner what entity employs the guards. A prisoner who
happens to be incarcerated in a privately-run prison should not have a
legal advantage in § 1983 suits over a prisoner in a state-run prison.
But after Richardson, a prisoner held in a privately-run prison may
be able to recover damages in a § 1983 action, when under the exact
same facts a prisoner held in a state-run prison would not even be
able to proceed to discovery. All prisoners should have equal con-
stitutional remedies.
The Court's reasoning may have been motivated by a belief
that privately-employed prison guards are somehow more likely to
violate a prisoner's individual rights than are state-employed
guards. 146 Thus, the Court may have denied qualified immunity to
145. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2111 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning the majority's
understanding of market forces).
146. The Court did not articulate this belief, but it did focus heavily on the increased
"vigor" of a privately-employed guard. Since "vigor" implies "force," the Court may have been
implying that a privately-employed prison guard is likely to sacrifice constitutional rights
through the use of force with prisoners. See id. at 2112 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing this theory
as a rationale behind the Court's decision that the Court "avoids mentioning").
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counterbalance its perception of the privately-employed guard's in-
creased tendency to violate the Constitution.147 This reasoning may
stem from a distrust of for-profit operations and a belief that
governmental officials are more motivated by the public good than are
private employees.148 But in Richardson, the Court did not cite any
evidence that individuals employed privately have reason to be less
respectful of the Constitution than publicly-employed individuals;
there is no evidence that constitutional violations increase profit.149
More likely, prison guards who perform the same duties and face the
same problems have the same tendency to respect or violate the
Constitution.
3. Treating Private Parties Like the State for Liability
But Not for Immunity
As further justification for its decision, the Court in
Richardson posited that private prison guards are no more important
than other privately-employed individuals who perform "publicly
important tasks" but do not have qualified immunity.5 0 Thus, the
Court found no reason to differentiate between the defendants and
other private parties for purposes of granting qualified immunity.
But the Court failed to recognize that other privately-employed indi-
viduals do not need qualified immunity from constitutional liability,
because they are not classified as state actors subject to constitutional
liability in the first place. Privately-employed individuals who per-
form governmental functions are fundamentally different from other
privately-employed individuals, because they are labeled state actors
and are subjected to constitutional liability.
147. The Court of Appeals decision affirmed by Richardson cited this theory as its primary
reason for denying qualified immunity to the defendants. See McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d 417,
424 (6th Cir. 1996) (We believe this increased threat of injury by violation of constitutional
guarantees counsels against granting qualified immunity to correctional officers employed by a
private corporation.").
148. See id (noting that "[the balance struck by qualified immunity, at least implicitly,
contemplates a government actor acting for the good of the state, not a private actor acting for
the good of the pocketbook").
149. See Citrano v. Allen Correctional Ctr., 891 F. Supp. 312, 319 (W.D. La. 1995), in which
the court reasoned:
ITihere does not seem to be any basis for concluding that prison workers employed by
government contractors have any less interest than government employed prison
workers in the good of the public or in civil rights. It seems more reasonable to conclude
that because they perform the same functions and face the same problems on a day to
day basis that their subjective attitudes about their jobs are more alike than different.
150. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2107. The Court did not provide further examples of
publicly important tasks.
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The Court in Richardson rejected a functional approach in
deciding whether to grant private parties qualified immunity, noting
that such an approach "bristles with difficulty" because government
and private industry engage in "fundamentally similar activities,
ranging from electricity production, to waste disposal, to even mail
delivery."151 But the Court already uses such a functional approach
when deciding whether to treat private parties like governmental offi-
cers under the state action doctrine.152 Thus, the Court uses a func-
tional approach to justify turning private parties into state actors
subject to constitutional restraints, but then the Court shuns that
same functional approach when determining the level of immunity
these private parties should have.
VII. CONCLUSION
A. Richardson's Effect on the Privatization Movement
Over the last thirty years the Supreme Court has greatly ex-
panded the scope of § 1983 liability. Although nothing in § 1983's
legislative history suggests that it was intended to impose
constitutional liability on private parties, § 1983 is now a powerful
weapon against private parties who are labeled state actors under the
state action doctrine. The Court has interpreted history liberally in
its reading of § 1983; however, the Court in Richardson applied a
strict historical analysis for determining the availability of qualified
151. Id. at 2106.
152. See supra note 84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the public function state
action test. In Richardson's attempt to distinguish private prison guards from governmental
prison guards, the Court noted that "correctional functions have never been exclusively public."
117 S. Ct. at 2104. This finding calls into question the Court's assumption that the private
prison guards are state actors. Both Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982), and Blum
v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982), focused on an "exclusivity" test, which holds that a
private party is not a state actor under the public function test unless that public function had
been traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state. When applied to Richardson's finding
that prisons have not been the exclusive domain of government, these cases suggest that the
Court would not find the private prison guards to be state actors. But in another case,
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991), the Court used the public function
test without the exclusivity requirement. In Edmonson, the Court stated the test as "whether
the actor is performing a traditional governmental function," notably leaving out the word
"exclusive." See id.; see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 52 (1992) (applying the
Edmonson test and omitting "exclusive" in determining whether a criminal defendant's exercise
of peremptory challenges constitutes a state action). Thus, although it is technically an open
question whether the private prison guards in Richardson are state actors, little doubt exists
that they are. See supra note 120.
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immunity for private parties. This contradiction in method
inequitably subjects private parties performing state functions to
more constitutional liability than the state itself.153 The irony of this
result is that the Constitution was designed to protect private parties
from the state's power and was not meant to restrict private party
behavior.
The Court's legal conclusions concerning the extent of § 1983
liability borne by a private party performing a governmental function
may reflect an underlying political prejudice against privatization.
This political prejudice, though unstated, is revealed by the Court's
implication that employees of for-profit companies are more likely to
violate an individual's constitutional rights.'5 4 But predicting whether
a government or private employee is more likely to violate people's
constitutional rights is a political decision about the merits of privati-
zation that is better made by the political branches of government. A
court is better suited to decide when a constitutional violation has
occurred, not to predict who is more likely to commit violations in the
future.
Even if the Court's analysis is not driven by its view of the
political merits of privatization, though, the Court's decision in
Richardson has the effect of unjustifiably handicapping the privatiza-
tion movement. 5 5 When a state or local government is deciding be-
tween having its employees perform a function or delegating the
function to a private organization, the decision should be made on the
basis of which better serves the community. The decision is an
inherently political choice involving many factors, including a deter-
mination of which method better protects people's rights. After
Richardson, however, even if the function could be better performed
by delegating to a private entity, the decision-making body may de-
cide to have governmental employees perform the task so they will be
eligible for the cover of qualified immunity.
By deciding to subject privately-employed individuals perform-
ing a governmental service to more constitutional liability than their
state-employed counterparts, the Court has diminished the feasibility
153. Cf. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 180 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Our § 1983
jurisprudence has gone very far afield indeed, when it subjects private parties to greater risk
than their public counterparts, despite the fact that § 1983's historic purpose was 'to prevent
state officials from using the cloak of their authority under state law to violate rights protected
against state infringement.' ").
154. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
155. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2212-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The only sure effect of
today's decision-and the only purpose, as far as I can tell--is that it will artificially raise the
cost of privatizing prisons.").
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of privatization. By artificially raising the costs of privatization, the
Court has effectively made a political choice about the future of pri-
vatization. The courts should leave the political question of privatiza-
tion to the political branches of government. The pros and cons of
privatization are complex and deserve a careful political balance
before a decision is made on whether to privatize. The judicial branch
should not weigh privatization's merits. Courts should instead
provide a level legal playing field that allows the political branches to
fairly assess the value of privatization without any artificial legal
handicaps.
B. A Way to Level the Playing Field After Richardson
The only way to provide a level legal playing field for privatiza-
tion is to overrule Richardson. Congress should pass legislation man-
dating that whether the government itself performs a function or the
government delegates the function to the private sector, those indi-
viduals performing the same function will be subject to the same level
of constitutional liability.156 This legislation would put the issue of
privatization back into the hands of the legislative and executive
branches of federal, state, and local governments. These political
branches of government could then decide whether to privatize based
on the merits, instead of having to consider the costs of increased
constitutional scrutiny applied to private providers of government
services. For example, the legislation could state:
A private party who is deemed to be a state actor for performing a function
delegated by any branch of federal, state, or local government shall have the
same immunities and defenses to a claim of constitutional liability as if such
party were a part of the delegating governmental entity.
Such a statute would guide courts back to considering only
functional categories when deciding whether to grant qualified im-
munity. Courts would decide to grant or not grant qualified immunity
to a provider of a governmental service based on what function the
individual performs, instead of who signs his paycheck. Such a stat-
ute would also resolve the inconsistency and unfairness of treating a
private party as a state actor for purposes of imposing constitutional
156. Congress has the power to overrule Richardson, as Richardson is an interpretation of
§ 1983, not the Constitution. Thus legislation of the type proposed here would not overrule a
constitutional decision, but rather would simply clarify a federal statute.
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liability but not for purposes of granting immunity to consitutional
liability.
C. A Way to Mitigate the Negative Effects of Richardson
In the absence of such a law from Congress, lower courts
should attempt to ameliorate the negative effects of Richardson as
much as possible. Fortunately, Richardson's holding left open the
possibility of a special "good faith" defense that could somewhat miti-
gate the extra constitutional liability imposed by Richardson on pri-
vately-employed persons performing governmental functions. 15
Richardson does not define this potential good faith defense, but
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Wyatt v. Cole does define
such a defense.
158
Justice Kennedy defines a good faith defense for private par-
ties that replicates the qualified immunity a state official received
under Wood v. Strickland before Harlow removed the subjective com-
ponent from qualified immunity. 59 Thus, a private party defendant
would escape constitutional liability if he were to show that he subjec-
tively believed his acts to be constitutional and that his belief was
objectively reasonable. 60 Under Harlow, a state officer can avoid
constitutional liability simply by showing that his acts were objec-
tively reasonable; his subjective intent is irrelevant. Harlow removed
the subjective component of Wood's qualified immunity because a
plaintiff with an otherwise frivolous claim could too easily force a
state officer to trial merely by alleging malicious intent. Harlow's
qualified immunity involves only an objective component that can
usually be resolved by summary judgment at the pleadings stage.' 6'
A private party good faith defense would, of course, suffer from
the same limitations that qualified immunity did under Wood before
157. See id. at 2108 (stating that its holding does not foreclose the possibility of a special
good faith defense for private parties).
158. See supra note 110.
159. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text and note 110 and accompanying text.
The Sixth Circuit, in a case decided before Richardson or Wyatt, defined a private party good
faith defense very similar to that in Justice Kennedy's Wyatt concurrence. See Duncan v. Peck,
844 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1988) (granting summary judgment to a private party defendant
accused of violating the plaintiffs constitutional rights because there was no material question
of fact as to the defendant's subjective good faith reliance on a reasonable interpretation of the
Constitution).
160. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. According to Wood, a belief is not
objectively reasonable if it is against "settled, indisputable law." See supra note 99 and
accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
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Harlow. A private party defendant accused of malicious intent would
still have to go to trial in a case where a state officer defendant
performing the same function could wi on summary judgment by
showing his acts to be objectively reasonable. Although not equal to
Harlow's qualified immunity, this good faith defense would,
nevertheless, somewhat mitigate the negative effects of Richardson.
A private provider of a governmental service would at least have some
defense to constitutional liability based on his good faith behavior,
even if he has to suffer through a lengthy trial to prove his good faith.
In the absence of a law overturning Richardson, courts should adopt
this good faith defense for private parties performing functions
delegated by the government.
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